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In this paper, we numerically investigate the robustness of cooperation clusters in prisoner’s
dilemma played on scale-free networks, where the network topologies change by continuous removal
and addition of nodes. Each removal and addition can be either random or intentional. We therefore
have four different strategies in changing network topology: random removal and random addition
(RR), random removal and preferential addition (RP), targeted removal and random addition (TR),
and targeted removal and preferential addition (TP). We find that cooperation clusters are most
fragile against TR, while they are most robust against RP, even for large values of the temptation
coefficient for defection. The effect of the degree mixing pattern of the network is not the primary
factor for the robustness of cooperation under continuous change in network topology, which is quite
different from the cases observed in static networks. Cooperation clusters become more robust as
the number of links of hubs occupied by cooperators increase. Our results might infer the fact that
a huge variety of individuals is needed for maintaining global cooperation in social networks in the
real world where each node representing an individual is constantly removed and added.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of cooperation is one of the challeng-
ing problems in both social and biological sciences. Co-
operators benefit others by incurring some costs to the
actor while defectors do not pay any costs. Thus, un-
der a well-mixed population, cooperation cannot evolve
because defectors are always better off than cooperators.
This relationship between cooperators and defectors is
well parametrized by the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game
[1]. In PD, two individuals decide whether to cooperate
or defect simultaneously. They both obtain R for mutual
cooperation and P for mutual defection. If one selects
cooperation and the other selects defection, the former
gets S for being the sucker of the defector, and the latter
gets T as a reward for the temptation to defect. The or-
der of the four payoffs is T > R > P > S in PD. Nowak
and May revealed that spatial structures are required for
the evolution of cooperation [2]. Recently, it has been
possible to map any given spatial structure on a suitable
network topology and the evolution of cooperation has
been investigated through the analysis of PD played on
the corresponding complex network [3–13].
In this context, the spatial structure required for the
emergence of cooperation is referred to as network reci-
procity and becomes one of the most important factors
for the emergence of cooperation [14]. If the network
reciprocity and some other mechanisms are combined,
cooperation is promoted more [15]. For instance, teach-
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ing activity [16], social diversity [17], an ability to in-
fer the reputation of others [18], a sparse environment
[19, 20], selecting high fitness individuals in adopting
strategies [21, 22], age structure [23], and incorporating
environmental factors as the fitness of the focal individ-
ual [24] promote cooperation when they are combined
with the network reciprocity. In these studies, various
“heterogeneities” enhancing cooperation combined with
network reciprocity are considered. On the other hand,
networks can generate structural heterogeneity by them-
selves, which we refer to here as “network heterogeneity.”
For scale-free networks, this network heterogeneity is the
key for promoting cooperation [8]. If cooperators occupy
hubs in a scale-free network surrounded by other cooper-
ators, the payoffs for these cooperators are considerably
higher than for other individuals. Thus, they can spread
their cooperative strategy. In contrast, if defectors oc-
cupy hubs surrounded by other defectors, this cluster of
defectors is quite vulnerable and is easily replaced by co-
operators. These two effects contribute to the evolution
of cooperation on scale-free networks.
For scale-free networks, the robustness of cooperation
has been examined on growing [25] or reducing [26] net-
works. Poncela et al. [25] have proposed an evolutionary
preferential attachment, in which high payoff nodes at-
tract more links from new nodes. They introduced a
control parameter, ǫ ∈ [0, 1), for the preference weight.
In the limit, ǫ→ 1, each existing node can get a new link
in proportion to its payoff. If ǫ = 0, a new link is con-
nected to any node at random, which means the payoffs
are completely ignored. They have shown that cooper-
ation is most promoted at the limit, ǫ → 1, resulting in
a scale-free network because a center cooperator in the
2cooperative group has a high preference weight and tends
to get a new link more easily. Moreover, this causes posi-
tive feedback of the increment of the degree of the center
cooperator. The rich get richer. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the network growth in this model is only in the
direction of increasing the number of nodes and that the
opposite possibility of decreasing the number of nodes is
totally ignored.
On the other hand, Perc [26] has studied the evolution
of cooperation in the direction of decreasing the number
of nodes. He has implemented two ways of node removal
from the Bara´basi and Albert (BA) network model [27].
One is random removal of a fraction of nodes Λ, and the
other is targeted removal of nodes from the largest degree
up to a fraction Λ. He has shown that the cooperation on
scale-free networks is extremely robust against random
node removal, while it declines rapidly against targeted
attack. Notice that, in his model, removed nodes are
never restored [26]. However, in artificial networks, there
are many cases in which the restoration of removed nodes
immediately occurs. Likewise, in ecological networks, a
vacant site due to the death of an individual is often
filled with a new individual immediately. Therefore, it is
plausible that a node removal is followed by an addition
of another new node. The present paper deals with such a
bidirectional network topological change and investigates
the effects of continuous removal and addition of nodes
in the evolution of cooperation.
One of the other factors that potentially affects the ro-
bustness of cooperation is the degree correlation between
nodes represented by degree mixing patterns, which was
investigated by Rong et al. [9]. In their model, a net-
work is referred to as assortative (disassortative) accord-
ing to the tendency of highly connected nodes (hubs) to
choose nodes with similar (dissimilar) degrees as neigh-
bors. Rong et al. have shown that the assortative net-
work favors defection because the hubs tend to connect
closely, which allows defectors to invade cooperators. In
contrast, cooperation is maintained in the disassortative
networks because the isolation of hubs due to disassorta-
tivity enables them to keep their initial strategy. At the
same time, however, the influence of the hubs becomes
weaker as the disassortativity increases because the ten-
dency of the isolation also increases. Therefore, uncor-
related networks promote cooperation to the maximum
extent by spreading the strategy of hubs most effectively.
This conclusion, nevertheless, only applies to networks
with a static topology. Once we allow the change of net-
work topology by removal and addition of nodes or links,
the mixing patterns change accordingly, and the conclu-
sion observed in static networks might fail to apply. It
is therefore also worth investigating the effects of the al-
teration of degree correlation caused by continuous node
removal and addition on the evolution of cooperation.
In this paper, we perform evolutionary simulations un-
der such topological changes of networks and find that
cooperation is decreased to the greatest extent when tar-
geted removal and random addition of nodes are com-
bined. In contrast, cooperation is maintained even at
a high temptation to defect when random removal and
preferential addition are combined. We also show that
the degree variance, which measures the network hetero-
geneity, directly controls the robustness of cooperation.
We find that the effect of the degree mixing pattern of the
network is not the primary factor for the robustness of
cooperation under a continuous change of network topol-
ogy due to consequential removal and addition of nodes,
which is quite different from the cases observed in static
networks.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we intro-
duce a model in which removal and addition processes
are considered on scale-free networks. In Sec. III, we
present the numerical results for the robustness of coop-
eration under such topological changes and an analysis of
the results from the view point of network heterogeneity
defined by the degree variance. We also investigate the
effect of the degree mixing pattern on the evolution of
cooperation. The summary and conclusion are given in
Sec. IV.
II. MODEL
To incorporate the network heterogeneity in the degree
distribution observed in real networks, we employ the
Baraba´si-Albert method for generating initial networks
in numerical experiments [27]. Starting from a complete
graph with a given small number of nodes m0, a new
node with m ≤ m0 links is added at every time step.
This new node is connected to m existing nodes selected
according to the probability pi = ki/
∑
ki, where ki is the
degree of node i of each selected node. Thus, nodes with
a larger degree are more likely to be selected, hence the
“preferential attachment.” After t discrete time steps,
the resulting network consists of N = t+m0 nodes and
mt links according to a power-law degree distribution
with an exponent of 3 [27].
We investigate the PD game on this initially scale-free
network. Let N be the total number of nodes occupied
by individuals; each of the nodes has its strategy classi-
fied as either C (cooperator) or D (defector). Initially,
both strategies C and D are randomly and equally dis-
tributed among the nodes of the network. Each node i
plays PD with all of its ki neighbors. The payoffs of the
game are the following. Both individuals obtain R for
mutual cooperation and P for mutual defection. If one
selects cooperation and the other selects defection, the
cooperator obtains S as the sucker of the defector, and
the defector obtains T as the reward for temptation to
defect. The order of the four payoffs is T > R > P > S
in PD. The sum of the payoff of individual i against its ki
neighbors is denoted by Pi. Following Nowak and May
[2], we set P = 0, T = b > 1, R = 1, and S = 0, where
b is the temptation to defect. Next, one randomly cho-
sen neighbor of i, denoted by j, also plays PD with its
neighbors and obtains the payoff Pj . If Pi < Pj , indi-
3vidual i imitates individual j’s strategy with probability
(Pj − Pi)/[(T − S)kmax], where kmax is the largest de-
gree between i and j. This update principle of strategy
has been adopted in various studies [8, 9, 26]. All in-
dividuals update their strategies simultaneously at each
time step. After this update, the network topology is al-
tered by one removal and one addition of nodes. Here we
consider the following four combinations of node removal
and addition. First, an existing node is removed in two
different ways, namely, random removal and targeted re-
moval. In the random removal, one randomly selected
node is removed. In the targeted removal, a node with
the largest degree is removed. In both cases, the links
connected to the removed node are also removed from
the network. After the removal, a new node is added in
two different ways, namely, random addition and pref-
erential addition. In the random addition, a new node
connects to m randomly selected existing nodes. In the
preferential addition, a new node of m degree connects
to each existing node with probability pi = ki/
∑
i ki.
Because the number of removed links is preserved, the
remaining links other than m are also connected in each
manner. We classify these four different combinations of
node removal and addition, which cause continuous al-
teration of the network topology, into the following four
models:
1. Random removal and Random addition (RR). Af-
ter the removal of one randomly selected node of
degree n, a new node of degree m is added and
connected to m randomly selected existing node.
If m < n, each remaining n −m link is connected
from a randomly selected node (referred to as the
source) to a randomly selected node (referred to as
the target). If m ≥ n, only n links of the added
node are connected to n existing nodes. For n = 0,
a new node immediately becomes an isolated node
after it is added. This linking principle is also ap-
plied to the other three models.
2. Random removal and Preferential addition (RP).
After the removal of one randomly selected node
of degree n, a new node of degree m is added and
connected to each existing node with probability
pi = ki/
∑
i ki, which is proportional to the degree
of node i. If m < n, each remaining n −m link is
connected from a randomly selected source node to
a target node with probability pi. If m ≥ n, only n
links of the added node are connected to n existing
nodes.
3. Targeted removal and Random addition (TR). Af-
ter the removal of the node with the largest degree
n among the existing nodes, a new node of degree
m is added and connected to m randomly selected
existing nodes. If m < n, each remaining n − m
link is connected from a randomly selected source
node to a randomly selected target node. If m ≥ n,
only n links of the added node are connected to n
existing nodes.
FIG. 1. (Color online) An example of one “generation” of
the evolutionary game considered in this paper. First, all
individuals update their strategies simultaneously. Then, one
defector with two links is selected for removal in this case.
Finally, one cooperator (the strategy is randomly selected) is
added and connected by two links to the existing nodes. This
“generation” is repeated up to a given number of steps. We
consider four models (RR, RP, TR, TP) for the removal and
addition of nodes.
4. Targeted removal and Preferential addition (TP).
After the removal of the node with the largest de-
gree n among the existing nodes, a new node of
degree m is added and connected to each existing
node with probability pi = ki/
∑
i ki. If m < n,
each remaining n−m link is connected from a ran-
domly selected source node to a target node with
probability pi. If m ≥ n, only n links of the added
node are connected to n existing nodes.
Note that for all four models, both the total number of
nodes and the total number of links remain unchanged.
In contrast, the network topologies do change. The strat-
egy of a newly added node is randomly chosen from
strategies C and D. The PD game of all existing nodes,
updating their strategies, and the node removal and ad-
dition procedure make up one entire process in a numer-
ical experiment, which we refer to as “generation.” This
generation is repeated up to a given number of steps.
Figure 1 shows a schematic picture of one generation.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
To generate the initial networks according to the BA
method, we took m = m0 = 2 and added nodes up to
N = 5000.
In Fig. 2, we plot the fraction of cooperators as a func-
tion of the temptation to defect b for the four models.
The results for each sample are obtained by averaging
over 1000 generations after a transient time of 10000 gen-
4erations. The final results are obtained by averaging over
20 independent samples for each set of parameters. The
fraction of cooperators shows quite different profiles de-
pending on the model. We also plot the case of the origi-
nal BA model. This case always shows the highest level of
cooperation because its hub structures, which benefit for
cooperation, are not altered. The evolution of coopera-
tion in models containing targeted node removal (TR and
TP) is considerably suppressed even for small values of
the temptation to defect b. The evolution of cooperation
is also suppressed in models containing random addition
of nodes (TR and RR). Thus, the fraction of cooperators
is the most fragile in the TR model, which is the com-
bination of targeted removal and random addition. In
contrast, the fraction of cooperator has relatively large
values in the RP model, which is the opposite combina-
tion of TR, even in the region with rather large values
for the temptation to defect.
The qualitative reason for this difference in the pro-
files of the fraction of cooperators is the following. It is
commonly known that the network heterogeneity deter-
mines the fate of cooperation [26]. If cooperators occupy
the hubs of a network surrounded by other cooperators,
their payoffs are considerably higher than other individ-
uals. Cooperative hubs can therefore easily spread their
strategy to the surrounding nodes. Since the fraction
of hubs is extremely small even in a scale-free network,
it is rare that a choice for random node removal hits a
hub. Thus, cooperative hubs are maintained in random
node removal. Moreover, the preferential addition tends
to increase the degree of the hubs, which contributes to
the resiliency of cooperation by expanding the network
heterogeneity. This is the reason of the resiliency of the
fraction of cooperators in the RP model. The reason of
the fragility in the TR model is completely opposite to
the case of the RP model. For quantitative support for
this reasoning, we next examine the network characteris-
tics relating to the network heterogeneity corresponding
to the four models.
A. Network heterogeneity
The network heterogeneity is represented by the de-
gree variance V = [(1/N)
∑
k2i − k¯
2]/k¯, where k¯ =
(1/N)
∑
ki. This value becomes zero if the all nodes
have the same degree while it takes a larger value if some
nodes have an extremely large degree, such as hubs.
Figure 3 shows the degree variance as a function of
generation in the four models. In all models, the degree
variance decreases as the generation increases from the
largest degree variance of the initial BA network.
The details of the collapse of the degree variance, how-
ever, are different in the four models. The degree vari-
ances in TR and TP show drastic decrease in the early
stages of generation because the largest hub is always re-
moved in the targeted models. On the other hand, the
values of the degree variance in RR and RP do not show
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function
of the temptation to defect b in our four different models and
the original BA model averaged over 20 independent samples.
In the BA model, the structure is kept unchanged during all
generations.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) The degree variance as a function of the
generation in the four models averaged over 20 independent
runs.
such a drastic decrease. In RP, in particular, a node is
randomly removed without paying attention to its degree,
and the preferential addition of node introduces new het-
erogeneity. The network heterogeneity that supports the
fraction of cooperators is thus mostly maintained in the
RP model.
In Fig. 4, we compare the final degree distribution of
the four models to the initial BA model. The RP model
maintains some hubs, while the other three models do
not. By conducting further network analysis, we find that
the four network topologies are completely altered from
that of the original BA model (Supplemental Fig. S1),
but the hubs in RP, which cause the network heterogene-
ity, are still maintained. This supports the result that
cooperation is robust in RP [28].
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FIG. 4. (Color online) The degree distribution at the final
generation in our four models along with the degree distri-
bution of the initial BA model averaged over 20 independent
runs.
B. Effect of the degree mixing pattern
It has been realized that the degree correlation be-
tween the node connection represented by the degree
mixing pattern sometimes considerably modifies the re-
sults obtained from the mean field analysis based only
on the degree distribution [29–33]. In static networks,
it is known that an uncorrelated network promotes co-
operation [9]. Here we investigate the effects of degree
correlation on the resilience of the clusters of coopera-
tors in the present cases in which the network topologies
are constantly changed.
According to Newman, we measure the degree corre-
lation of a network by the Pearson coefficient rk [34]. If
rk is positive, nodes with almost the same degree tend
to be connected; the correlation is denoted as “assorta-
tive.” In assortative networks, hubs tend to be connected
to other hubs. If rk is negative, nodes with different de-
grees tend to be connected; the correlation is denoted as
“disassortative.” In disassortative networks, hubs tend
to be connected to nodes with small degrees. Newman
pointed out that the Pearson coefficient of the BA model
takes a very small value, rk ≈ 0, which means that the
BA networks are almost uncorrelated [34].
Figure 5 shows the variation of the correlation coeffi-
cient with respect to the generation. We see three dif-
ferent correlation regimes: disassortative (RP and TP),
uncorrelated (TR), and assortative (RR). By reexamin-
ing the results for the fraction of cooperators (Fig. 2) in
terms of degree correlation (Fig. 5), the RP model, in
which the fraction of cooperators is most robust, falls in
the disassortative regime. It does not seem, however, that
the degree correlation plays a key role in the robustness
of the cooperation since the fraction of cooperators in the
TP model, which also falls in the disassortative regime,
is rather fragile. For the robustness of cooperation, the
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The correlation coefficient (rk) as a
function of the generation in the four models averaged over
20 independent runs.
resiliency of the hubs with the largest degree controlling
the stability of cooperation is most important. In this
regard, elimination of the hubs due to targeted attack
is most fatal to the robustness of the cooperation. On
the contrary, random node removal rarely hits the hubs
in elimination. This is the main reason for the differ-
ence between RP and TP in the PD game on networks
with continuously changing of network topology. The
fate of cooperation is thus dominated by the network
heterogeneity and the degree correlation seems to be a
secondary factor in the dynamic network.
It should be noted that the fraction of cooperators is
most fragile in the TR model, which falls in the uncor-
related regime. This result is different from the analysis
of static networks, where uncorrelated networks have an
advantage in terms of the robustness of the clusters of
cooperators [9].
IV. SUMMARY
The evolution of cooperation is still an open question in
various fields. It is commonly accepted that the network
structure is one of the main controlling factors for the
promotion of cooperation. In social or ecological systems
in the real world, it is plausible to assume that an indi-
vidual or a species represented by a node is constantly
replaced by or added to another, which introduces a con-
tinuous topological change in the network structure. It
is therefore important to know whether cooperation is
maintained under such circumstances.
Based on these motivations, we numerically investi-
gated the robustness of cooperation on scale-free net-
works under continuous topological changes due to the
removal and addition of nodes in a network. We have
found that cooperation is most robust against random
removal and preferential addition of nodes, while coop-
6eration is most vulnerable against targeted attack. The
damage caused by the targeted attack is not fully com-
pensated by either random or preferential addition. By
calculating several network characteristics, we have re-
vealed that the network heterogeneity dominates the fate
of cooperation. If the degree variance is large, coopera-
tion is maintained. We have also shown that the degree
correlation does not affect the cooperation much on dy-
namical networks because cooperation mainly depends
on the existence of cooperative hubs, which shows a sharp
distinction from the cases observed in static networks.
These results might explain the fact that a vast variety
of individuals is needed in a society where many individ-
uals independently join and leave because hubs are actu-
ally important for maintaining cooperation on an online
friendship network [35].
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